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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900418-CA

Category No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from conviction of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990), in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's

motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the stop of defendant's
vehicle was legal and justified and finding that defendant
voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle ?

Because of

the trial court's advantageous position in determining the
factual basis for a motion to suppress, this Court will not
reverse the trial court's factual evaluation unless its findings
are clearly erroneous.

State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

However, in assessing the trial court's

legal conclusions based upon the factual findings, this Court

applies a correction of error standard. Id.
2.

Was the evidence at trial sufficient to support

defendant's conviction?

When a defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State
v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
S.Ct. 1837 (1990).
3.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on

reasonable doubt?

An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury

instructions presents a question of law.

Carpet Barn v. State of

Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The trial court's

legal conclusion is not accorded any deference and is reviewed
under a correction of error standard. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d
at 1251.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Miguel Enrique Salas, was charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1990) (R. 7-8). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence
-2-

seized as a result of a consent search following a vehicle stop
(R. 18-19).

The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing,

denied defendant's motion (R. 23, 98-101).

Defendant was

convicted of the charge after a jury trial and was sentenced to a
term not to exceed five years (R. 94, 110-111).

Defendant's

sentence was stayed, and defendant was placed on probation for a
period of 36 months (R. 110-111). Defendant timely filed a notice
of appeal (R. 114-115).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 2, 1990, Officer William F. McCarthy of the
West Valley City metro narcotics division received information
from a confidential informant that defendant would be trafficking
in drugs (transcript of hearing on motion to suppress
[hereinafter

f, M

T ] at 5, 11). Officer McCarthy was given a

physical description of defendant, defendant's name, date of
birth, age, where he worked, what time he was going to lunch and
what type of vehicle he would be driving (T. 6). He was also
told that defendant would have cocaine in his possession and that
defendant would be selling the cocaine during his lunch hour
(Id.)

In addition, Officer McCarthy had a photograph of

defendant (Id..). Special Agent Craig Englin of the U.S.
Immigration Service and a back up unit of detectives were working
with Officer McCarthy (Ld.).
At approximately 11:00 a.m. Officer McCarthy checked
the state computer to see if defendant had a valid driver's
license and was unable to find a license under the name of Miguel
-3-

Salas (T. 4 ) . He subsequently checked the names Miguel Enrique
Salas, Enrique Miguel Salas, Enrique Leyva-Salas and Miguel
Leyva-Salas but was still unable to find a valid Utah driver's
license (T. 27). Just before stopping defendant, Officer
McCarthy did a secondary license check using the Salt Lake City
police dispatcher, and that check also revealed no license in the
name of Miguel Salas (T. 5).
At about noon defendant left his place of employment,
Utah Metal, and drove south on North Beck Street (T. 7), Officer
McCarthy stopped defendant, identified himself and asked for
defendant's license (Id.)-

Defendant was not able to produce a

license from the wallet he was carrying, stating that he had left
it in his other wallet at work (T. 7-8). Officer McCarthy asked
defendant for the vehicle registration and was given the
vehicle's title, which was under the names "Miguel/Janet or
Jeanette Salas" (T. 47). The vehicle registration was later
found in the glove box under the names "Miguel/Janet Salas"
(Id.).

Officer McCarthy believed that defendant was cited for

driving without a license by one of the uniformed police officers
who acted as backup at the scene, but he did not cite defendant
himself because he did not carry a citation book (T. 17;
transcript of trial [hereinafter "TA"] at 21). After defendant's
arrest, he was booked under the name of Miguel Enrique Salas
because that is the name he gave Officer McCarthy (T. 49).*
1

It is interesting to note that not only was defendant's
case at the district court heard under the name of Miguel Enrique
Salas, but all of defendant's appellate filings, including his
-4-

After defendant failed to produce a valid license,
Officer McCarthy explained that he had stopped defendant for
driving without a license and that he had information that
defendant would be driving that car and possibly be in possession
of cocaine (T.8).

Officer McCarthy then asked defendant if he

could search him and his vehicle (.Id. ) . At that point Officer
McCarthy felt that defendant might be suffering from a language
barrier and asked Agent Englin to translate the request into
Spanish (T. 8-9). Defendant was informed that he did not have to
consent to the search (T. 22-23, 30). However, he consented to
the requested search, giving his response to the Spanish question
in English, stating "go ahead" (T. 9, 31, 35). Both Officer
McCarthy and Agent Englin observed that defendant was calm,
cooperative and not apprehensive (T. 10, 31). After a search of
two or three minutes, cocaine was found under the back seat, and
defendant was arrested (T. 10, 26, 33).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the
cocaine, defendant produced a valid Utah driver's license under
the name of Miguel S. Leyva (R. 24-25, 41). At that time
defendant stated that his immigration card was under the name of
Salas (T. 44).

notice of appeal, request for transcript, certification of
transcripts, designation
of
record, docketing
statement,
appearance of co-counsel and motion for extension of time for
preparation of appellant's brief were also under the name of
Miguel Enrique Salas.
It was not until defendant filed his
appellate brief that he began using the name Miguel Enrique
Salas-Leyva for the purpose of this case.
-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The stop of defendant's vehicle was not in violation of
the fourth amendment because the officer who stopped defendant
had reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating the law by
driving without a valid license. Moreover, the traffic stop was
not a pretext stop because the police officer did not use a legal
justification to make the stop in order to search defendant for
contraband.

A hypothetical reasonable police officer would have

stopped defendant for driving without a valid license.
Defendant's failure to raise the issue of scope of
detention at the trial court precludes him from raising that
issue for the first time on appeal.
Because the stop of defendant was proper, no police
illegality tainted the voluntary consent that defendant gave to
the search of his vehicle.
Defendant fails to properly marshal the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

If the

evidence in the case is reviewed, the cumulative facts before the
jury clearly support its guilty verdict.
The trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was
proper in the light of existing case law, as evidenced by both
Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals decisions.

The case

of Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990), has no applicability
to the instant instruction.
-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AFTER A TRAFFIC
STOP AND CONSENSUAL SEARCH WAS PROPER AND DID
NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The police officer who stopped defendant
had reasonable suspicion, based on
articulable factsf to believe that defendant
had violated the law.
Defendant initially argues that Officer McCarthy lacked
"reasonable articulable suspicion" based on objective facts that
the defendant or one of the occupants of his vehicle had
committed or was about to commit a crime when he stopped
defendant for driving without a valid license (Br. of Appellant
at 12).
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or
equipment regulation or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 663 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d
1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v.
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986).

In Utah, that

constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion standard has been
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990), as follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
-7-

commit a public offense and may demand a
name, address and explanation of his actions.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the
degree of suspicion required for police to make an investigative
stop, stating:
[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes if the officer has
a reasonable suspicion supported by
articulable facts that criminal activity "may
be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable
cause.
The officer, of course, must be able to
articulate something more than an "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."
rTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,] 27 [(1968)].
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal
level of objective justification" for making
the stop. INS v. Delqado, 466 U.S. 210, 217
(1984). That level of suspicion is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
In the instant case Officer McCarthy had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had violated the
law by driving without a valid license.

He checked the state

computer under five different possible variations of defendant's
name, including the name defendant provided later at his booking
and which has been used throughout this case and the name under
which his vehicle was registered and titled (T. 4, 27, 47). In
the absence of license verification on the state computer,
Officer McCarthy also ran a secondary license check through the
Salt Lake City police dispatcher (T. 5). That check also
revealed no valid license under the name Miguel Salas.

The valid

Utah driver's license that defendant produced at the hearing on
-8-

his motion to suppress was under the name Miguel S. Leyva, a name
he did not use on any other legal documents.

Officer McCarthy

diligently sought to verify a valid license under defendant's
name, and his inability to find a license afforded reasonable
suspicion for an investigative stop of defendant.

If any party

can be judged responsible for Officer McCarthy's failure to find
evidence of defendant's license it must be defendant himself, who
retained a license under a name he did not use.

The trial court

was correct in finding that the stop was justified (R. 100).
Defendant cites several cases in support of his
argument that Officer McCarthy lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop defendant's vehicle.

In the first, State v. Constantino,

732 P.2d 125, 126 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court found that
a police officer had validly stopped defendant because the
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was
driving with a revoked license and that an active warrant was out
for defendant's arrest.

Defendant suggests that the officer's

affirmative confirmation of those facts in Constantino creates
the standard from which to judge whether the stop in the instant
case was justified (Br. of Appellant at 14). "Affirmative
confirmation" of a crime is not the standard under which to
assess

the validity of an investigative traffic stop.

In both

Constantino and Gibson the Utah Supreme Court relied on the
Delaware v. Prouse standard to uphold the investigative stop of a
motorist when there was "articulable and reasonable suspicion
that a motorist [was] unlicensed." State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d
-9-

at 126; State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d at 1304. As previously
demonstrated, Officer McCarthy had reasonable suspicion to
believe that defendant was unlicensed, and the investigative stop
was valid.
Defendant also cites to several cases to support the
proposition that "the collective knowledge of all of the officers
involved [in a stop] must provide sufficient grounds to justify a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. De
Leon-Revna, 898 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir-), reh'g granted, 908 F.2d
1229 (1990); Whitelv v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); United
States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). Although that assertion
may be true, the State cannot see its applicability to the
instant case.

Both Whitelv and Henslev involved police officer

reliance on bulletins from other police departments, where the
Court assessed the factual basis of the underlying bulletin as
opposed to the good faith of the officer relying on the bulletin.
In De Leon-Revna, the court found that the police officer's
negligence in erroneously transmitting the suspect vehicle's
license plate number for a registration report resulted in a stop
not supported by reasonable suspicion.2

In the instant case,

Officer McCarthy did not rely on bulletins from other police
agencies and did not act negligently in transmitting defendant's
name for a driver's license check.
2

In contrast, he transmitted

In De Leon-Revna, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
reheard the case on its own motion.
Appellate briefs were
resubmitted, and oral argument was heard on Jan. 23, 1991 by the
court sitting en banc.
As of the filing of this brief, no
decision has been released.
-10-

defendant's correct name to the state computer and found no valid
license.

Defendant's reliance on the above-stated cases is

misplaced.
Finally, this Court also can affirm the trial court's
ruling that defendant was properly stopped by finding that
Officer McCarthy had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based
upon the information he received concerning defendant's drug
trafficking. See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)
(an appellate court may affirm a decision on any proper grounds
"even though the trial court assigned another reason for its
ruling").

Although defendant's motion to suppress generally

raised the issue of the officer's alleged lack of reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle, both parties largely
confined their arguments to whether Officer McCarthy had
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for a traffic
infraction (R. 18). However, the evidence presented at the
hearing on defendant's motion supports an investigative stop to
confirm whether defendant was in possession of illicit drugs.
In Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court, applying a totality of the
circumstances test (i.e. considering the quantity and quality of
the information possessed by police), found that an anonymous
tip, corroborated by police, exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify an investigative stop of the defendant's
vehicle. J[d. at 2417. There, police received an anonymous tip
that the defendant would be leaving a particular apartment, at a
-11-

particular time in a particular vehicle, that she would be going
to a particular motel, and that she would be in possession of
cocaine.

Police went to the defendant's apartment, saw the

vehicle matching the description they had, saw the defendant
leave the building and enter the vehicle.

She proceeded toward

the motel by the most direct route, and the police stopped her
just before she reached the motel.

Thereafter, a consensual

search revealed marijuana, and cocaine was also found after the
defendant's arrest.

In upholding the original investigative

stop, the Court noted that an anonymous tip alone rarely provides
reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.

However, an

anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police work, could
furnish sufficient indicia of reliability for a stop based on
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 2415-2416.

See also Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (where the Court, in the context of
probable cause, took into account facts known to police officers
from personal observation, and, giving an anonymous tip the
weight it deserved in light of that independent police work,
upheld a police search of the defendants' home and car); State v.
Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where a concerned
citizen's call to Crime Solvers, corroborated by independent
police observation, provided sufficient probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d
833 (9th Cir. 1990); United v. Rodriguez, 835 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.
1988).
In the instant case, the police were given information
-12-

by a confidential informant who had not been previously used,
although the record does not indicate that the informant was
anonymous (T. 11). The police received a physical description of
defendant, his name, date of birth, age, were told where he
worked, what time he would go to lunch, the type of vehicle he
would be driving and that he would have cocaine (T. 4,6).
Officer McCarthy also had obtained a photograph of defendant (T.
6).

The officers went to defendant's place of employment, saw

him leave the building at about noon, enter his vehicle and drive
away (T. 6,7)• He appeared to be the same person who was in the
photograph (T. 7). Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the Alabama v. White and Illinois v. Gates tip
plus independent corroborative police investigation standard is
clearly met in the instant case.

The investigative stop of

defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in drug trafficking.
B. The stop of defendant's vehicle did not
constitute an unconstitutional pretext stop.
Defendant also claims that the investigative stop was
an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when the police
use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a
person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated
serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a stop." United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d
1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P2d 684, 689
-13-

(Utah 1990), this Court set forth the following standard for
determining whether an unconstitutional pretext stop has
occurred:
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer
would not have stopped the driver for the
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext,
the stop is unconstitutional.
754 P.2d at 979.

See also State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer
could have made the stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 97 8 (relying on
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The test

is an objective one, and the "subjective intent of the police
officer is irrelevant." Id., at 977-78; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515,
1517.
A problem with pretext stop analysis is illustrated by
both Arroyo and Smith.

Neither case clearly indicates what

evidentiary basis is necessary to a determination of whether "a
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the
circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped [the
defendant] to issue a [traffic citation]." Smith, 781 P.2d at 883
(quoting Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978). This evidentiary difficulty
is well illustrated in the Guzman opinion, where the Tenth
Circuit declined, on the basis of an inadequate record, to rule
on the validity of the trial court's conclusion that a pretext
-14-

stop had occurred, stating:
In this case, the district court conducted a
subjective inquiry, which we conclude was
inappropriate. The only information in the
record reflecting general police practice was
apparently based upon the district court's
prior experience with this officer rather
than testimony about general practices. We
have neither the evidence nor the necessary
findings about objective reasonableness to
permit us to apply the appropriate
[objective] test.
864 F.2d at 1518. Neither Arroyo nor Smith made any reference to
evidence regarding general police practices. Arroyo only alluded
to the officer's testimony that lie issued three or four citations
for "following too closely" in 1987. Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155 n.
2. Apparently, no evidence was presented to the trial court about
the general practice of police officers in this state or in the
particular officer's territory with respect to issuing citations
for that traffic offense.

Smith made no reference to any

evidence to support the conclusion that the signaling violation
there was one for which officers regularly issue citations.

In

addition, neither case clearly articulated what weight is to be
given general police practice in evaluating the circumstances
i

surrounding a stop.

Defendant suggests that this Court rely on the police
officer's subjective state of mind as one of the

circumstances

to be considered in assessing whether a reasonable officer would
have made the stop (Br. of Appellant at 19). To do so would be
to gut the fundamental basis for pretext stop analysis and
thereby render the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard
-15-

obsolete.3

Moreover, it would make the determination of the

validity of the stop much more difficult to evaluate by forcing
courts to look at subjective underlying motivation, an analysis
that this Court has thus far repeatedly refused to adopt. See,

3

A number of federal and state courts have rejected the
pretext analysis adopted in Sierra and have limited the inquiry
to whether the police had either reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to justify the seizure (i.e. a stop or an arrest). See,
e.g. , United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990) (which
specifically rejects the pretext test adopted in United States v.
Smith and United States v. Guzman); State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App.
380, 786 P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or.
1990). The inquiry does not go beyond that point to ask whether
a police officer would have effected the seizure under the
circumstances, ibid. "'[SJo long as the police are doing no more
that they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do,
[the resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional.'" Cummins, 920
F.2d at 501 (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041
(7th Cir. 1989) (relying upon United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (M[T]he Court has told us that where
police officers are objectively doing what they are legally
authorized to do . . . the results of their investigations are
not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective
intent with which they acted.")).
This approach is most consistent with the well settled
principle that "the fact that the officer does not have the state
of mind which is hypothecated [sic] by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United states, 436
U.S. 128, 138 (1978). "The Court's language leaves little doubt
that 'the officer's actual state of mind at the time of the
challenged action was taken[]' is of no significance in
determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has
occurred." Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501 (quoting Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the
"usual police practices" approach, inherent in the pretext
analysis of Sierra, is a far reaching check on the discretion of
individual police officers not firmly grounded in the United
States Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence.
"The
[Supreme] Court . . . has never indicated that the discretionary
exercise of the arrest [or detention] power, a power that is
contingent upon a prior determination or probable cause [or
reasonable suspicion], is constitutionally significant." Trigg,
878 F.2d at 1041.
-16-

e.g., Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767,
771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155; Smith,
781 P.2d at 883.

If this Court continues to apply the pretext

stop analysis to assess whether the fourth amendment has been
violated, it must also adhere to an objective analysis. As the
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit stated:
This test properly preserves the Supreme
Court's requirement of an objective inquiry
into Fourth Amendment activity, see Maryland
v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct.
2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98
S.Ct. 1717, 1723-24, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978),
and provides meaningful judicial review of
discretionary police action.
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517.
In the instant case, Officer McCarthy had objective
justification for stopping defendant to determine whether he was
driving without a valid license, a clear violation of Utah
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (Supp. 1990). Although the
record is rather scant concerning general police policy regarding
citations for driving without a valid license, on cross
examination Officer McCarthy was asked whether it was usual
procedure to issue a citation for driving without a license.

He

responded that he believed defendant had been cited for the
offense (T. 17). Defendant has not produced any evidence showing
that police officers do not normally cite for this offense. When
alleging that a pretext stop has occurred, a defendant should
bear the burden of proving that allegation, once the State has
born its original burden of showing the constitutionality of the
-17-

stop (i.e. that the police officer had reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to believe that the defendant was violating the
law). See State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10

(which

suggests that, when alleging a pretext stop, a defendant bears
some burden in showing that a hypothetical reasonable officer
would not have made a particular traffic stop); see also United
States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d 1367, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990).

Applying

an objective standard, a hypothetical police officer would have
stopped a person for driving without a license, and the stop of
defendant for that traffic infraction was not a pretext stop that
violated the fourth amendment.

The trial court's conclusion that

the stop was legal and justified is correct and should not be
disturbed (R.100).
C. Defendant's failure to raise the issue of
the scope of a traffic stop at the trial
court bars him from raising the issue for the
first time on appeal.
Defendant argues that police officers exceeded the
permissible scope of a traffic stop in violation of the fourth
amendment.

However, defendant did not raise or develop that

issue in his motion to suppress.

Failure to raise issues below

normally bars a defendant from raising the issue for the first
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct.
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991);
State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

This Court has

applied this principle of appellate review in the context of
fourth amendment challenges, stating:
[W]here a defendant fails to assert a
-18-

particular ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court will not consider that ground
on appeal.
State v, Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)).

In Webb, this

Court noted the Carter court's reliance on State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981), in which the Utah
Supreme Court pointed out that suppression motions should be
supported by precise averments, not conclusory generalizations,
and held that, in the absence of special circumstances, the
appellate court will not rule on available grounds not addressed
in the trial court. Webb, 790 P.2d at 78. Finally, this Court,
again quoting Carter and Lee, stated:
[T]o entertain the point now would be to
sanction the practice of withholding
positions that should properly be presented
to the trial court but which may be withheld
for purposes of seeking a reversal on appeal
and a new trial or dismissal.
Webb, 790 P.2d at 78 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 661, and Lee,
633 P.2d at 53).

That reasoning is compelling, and this Court

should continue to adhere to the requirement that suppression
issues be raised at the trial court.
D. Defendant voluntarily consented to the
search of his vehicle, and that consent was
not preceded by any police misconduct or
illegal action.
Defendant finally argues both that defendant's consent
was tainted by a prior police illegality, in accordance with the
test articulated in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah
1990), and that the trial court erred in finding that defendant's
-19-

consent to search his vehicle was voluntary.
can be summarily addressed.

The first argument

Arroyo applies only to those cases

in which consent is given following some police misconduct and is
intended to prevent law enforcement officials from exploiting
their prior illegalities to obtain consent.

In the instant case,

there was no illegality by the police prior to defendant's
consent to the search of his vehicle.

Police officers properly

stopped defendant based on reasonable suspicion that he was
driving without a valid driver's license or transporting illicit
drugs.

Consequently, Arroyo does not apply, and defendant's

reliance upon it is misplaced.
Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in
finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of his
vehicle must also fail.

As the United States Supreme Court

stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is
"well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions
to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a
search that is conducted pursuant to [valid] consent." .Id., at 219
(citations omitted).

For consent to be valid it must be freely

and voluntarily given. .Id. at 222. This Court has likewise
recognized the voluntary consent exception to fourth amendment
requirements. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754

P.2d at 980. To determine whether consent to search was
voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result
-20-

of "duress or coercion, express or implied."

Marshall, 791 P.2d

at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The State carries
the burden of proof in showing that a defendant's consent was
voluntary.
(1980).

United States v. Mendenhall, 412 U.S. 544, 557

Voluntariness of consent is a question of fact, and an

appellate court deferentially reviews a trial court's finding of
voluntary consent and will not reverse absent clear error.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,
437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);

Marshall, 791 P.2d at 880; State v.

Webb, 790 P.2d at 82; State v. Sterqer, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 30,
33, 34 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Grovier, 155 Utah Adv.
Rep. 37, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).But see State v. Bobo, 149 Utah
Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. (1990) (voluntariness of consent
is a mixed question of fact and law).
In the instant case, defendant was asked if he
consented to the search in both English and Spanish (T. 8, 9, 31,
35).

He was informed that he did not have to consent to the

search (T. 22-23, 30). Both Officer McCarthy and Agent Englin
testified that defendant said, "go ahead" (T. 9, 31). Defendant
stated that he did not consent to the search (T. 43). However,
it is the province of the trial court, acting as the trier of
fact, to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and its
determination that defendant's consent was voluntary was not
clearly erroneous and should not be overturned.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION
Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed
to show that he actually or constructively possessed the cocaine
found in the back seat of his vehicle.

The power of this Court

to review a jury verdict challenged on sufficiency of evidence is
"quite limited." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

The evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from

it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990).

Accordingly, this Court requires

defendants challenging the sufficiency of evidence on appeal to
marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39 (adopting the "marshal the
evidence" standard for use in appeals from jury verdicts in
criminal cases where sufficiency of evidence is at issue).
In the instant case, defendant has made a nominal
effort to marshal the evidence in favor of the jury verdict but
fails to cite to any specific evidence, such as the testimonies
of Officer McCarthy and Agent Englin, that support that verdict
(Br. of Appellant at 32). Moreover, defendant has not even
attempted to demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is still
-22-

insufficient to support the verdict. Id,, at 738. On that basis
alone, this Court should reject defendant's insufficiency
argument.
However, should this Court entertain the argument, the
evidence still supports the jury's verdict.

A conviction for

possession of a controlled substance requires proof that a
defendant "knowingly and intentionally • . . possess or use a
controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990).
"Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional
possession.

However, actual physical possession is not necessary

to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance
(citation omitted).

A conviction may also be based on

constructive possession . . . .

'where the contraband is subject

to [defendant's] dominion and control.'" State v. Fox, 7 09 P.2d
316, 318-19 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72,
74 (Utah 1981).

To prove constructive possession of a drug the

State must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the defendant
and the drug to permit an inference that the defendant had the
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug.
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
In the instant case, Officer McCarthy testified to the
fact that a confidential informant had notified the police that,
during the lunch hour, defendant would be in a particular vehicle
and delivering cocaine (TA. 11).A He was also given the license
A

At trial defendant objected to Officer McCarthy's
testimony concerning the informant's information on the basis of
hearsay, but his objection was overruled (TA. 11). Defendant now
-23-

number of the vehicle (TA. 12). When defendant left his place of
employment at about noon, he was followed and stopped (TA. 13).
Defendant was asked to produce a license and vehicle
registration.

Although he was unable to produce a valid license

or registration, he did produce a title to the vehicle in the
name of Jeanette/Miguel Salas (jCd.).

After defendant consented

to a search of his vehicle, cocaine was found behind the back
seat (TA. 16). Agent Englin testified to the same events as
Officer McCarthy but also stated that defendant had told him, "
they put it [the cocaine] there" (TA. 36, 38, 40, 51). Although
two other passengers were in the vehicle with defendant,
defendant produced no evidence to rebut the clear inference that
the cocaine was at least constructively possessed by defendant.
The vehicle was owned and driven by defendant, and cocaine was
found behind the rear seat.
In further support of the jury's verdict, the jury
instructions properly apprised the jury of the elements of the
offense of possession of a controlled substance (R. 80;
instruction 13) and the meaning of "unlawful," "intentionally,"
and "knowingly" (R. 81-81; instructions 14, 15,16).

The jury was

also instructed concerning "constructive possession" (R. 84;
asserts that the trial court's action was improper, but he offers
no analysis, does not show that the statements were offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted and does not assert that
the alleged impropriety was substantive (i.e. that it affected
the outcome of the trial). See In re Estate of Hock, 655 P. 2d
1111 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid. 103, 801. Eecause defendant has
failed to support an argument by legal analysis or authority,
this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Amicone, 689
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).
-24-

instruction 17) and the fact that the mere presence of a
defendant at the scene of a crime was not, in and of itself,
evidence of his guilt (R. 85; instruction 18).
The unrebutted evidence presented at trial provided a
sufficient nexus between defendant and the cocaine found in his
vehicle.

The jury instructions properly apprised the jury of the

law regarding possession of a controlled substance.

Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is
clearly sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON REASONABLE DOUBT
Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction
submitted to the jury was inadequate in light of the recent
United States Supreme Court, decision, Cage v. Louisiana. Ill
S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990). This Court has previously approved the
precise instruction given in this case after having considered
the directives of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 11A
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1989). State v. Pederson, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 ( Utah Ct. App.
1990) (a copy of the instruction is attached hereto as Addendum
A).
However, defendant contends that the jury instructions
in Cage v. Louisiana and the instant case are so similar that the
instruction must necessarily be construed to be invalid.

In

support, defendant asserts that both instructions "have a
presumption of innocence clause," both require acquittal if the
-25-

state does not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
both state that reasonable doubt need not be proven to an
absolute certainty, both define a reasonable doubt as one based
on reason and one that a reasonable person would entertain, and
both disallow a reasonable doubt to be one that is merely
fanciful, imaginary or wholly speculative (Brief of Appellant at
37 n.9).

However, none of these aspects of the instruction were

found to be constitutionally defective in Cage, and defendant's
own jury instruction also includes each of these clauses (a copy
of defendant's proposed instruction is attached hereto as
Addendum B ) .

Defendant does not assert that his proposed

instruction is defective pursuant to Cage, and his skewed attack
on the instruction given by the trial court must fail.
Cage condemned the combined use of phrases equating a
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial
doubt," and "moral certainty."

The combination of this

terminology, even when viewed in the context of the instructions
as a whole, allowed for a "finding of guilt based on a degree of
proof below that required by the Due Process Clause."
S. Ct. at 329-30.
case.

Cage, 111

But, these terms were not used in defendant's

Therefore, Cage has no applicability to the instant

instruction.

Accord State of Idaho v. Rhoades, 1991 WL 15607

(Idaho Feb. 13, 1991); Lord v. State of Nevada, 1991 WL 13535
(Nev. Feb. 7, 1991).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's conviction.
DATED this
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.

000074

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

A defendant is presumed innocent unless that defendant is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt*

If you have a reasonable

doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal*

The burden is

upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The state's evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require proof to
an absolute certainty.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and
«

women would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of
evidence in this case.

Depending upon the circumstances,

possibilities may create a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless,

reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or
imaginary, or is based upon a wholly speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and
resonable doubt.

eliminates all

A determination that a defendant has committed a

crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason,
impartiality and common sense.

You must have greater assurance of

the correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life.

The reason

for this standard is that you cannot undo your verdict once you have

ut'rij,^

In your personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to undo or
modify the consequences of decisions you make.
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